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i Abstract 
This paper examines the determinants of the rate of forced insolvency 
in New Zealand. The study incorporates two key features. First, we use regional 
as well as national data to explain insolvencies. The data cover six regions which 
have had a variety of economic experiences over the sample period (1988–2003). 
Second, we explain the total rate of forced insolvency in New Zealand, including 
both personal bankruptcies and involuntary company liquidations. We find that 
increases in regional economic activity and regional property values (the latter 
representing collateral effects) reduce regional insolvencies. An increase in credit 
provision (increased leverage) raises the rate of insolvencies. In a low-inflation 
environment, a rise in the inflation rate reduces insolvencies, but this effect 
disappears in a high-inflation environment. We show that interactions between 
economic activity, leverage and property price shocks provide a rich 
understanding of how region-specific shocks can compound into significant 
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iv 1 Introduction 
In the firm life cycle, a great number of firms do not reach maturity. Of 
those that survive childhood, some may live to middle age (and may or may not 
prosper), while a few successful firms may survive with great longevity. Two types of 
studies have been undertaken in order to analyse the likelihood and/or the 
determinants of firm survival. The first type looks at individual firms and explains the 
factors that determine the likelihood of firms dying or progressing from one stage of 
the life cycle to the next (Bartelsman and Doms, 2000). The second type examines 
what determines the failure rate at the aggregate level, and explains the proportion of 
firms that fail over time (Wadhwani, 1986; Platt and Platt, 1994; Vlieghe, 2001). 
This study is of the second type, incorporating two key features. First, we 
use regional as well as national data to explain insolvencies. We disaggregate 
New  Zealand insolvency statistics into six regions which have had a variety of 
economic experiences over the sample period (1988Q1–2003Q2). The period starts at 
the mid-point of New Zealand’s major economic reforms, which included removal of 
agricultural subsidies, reduction of industry protection, labour market deregulation, 
privatisation, social welfare reform, fiscal consolidation and anti-inflationary 
monetary policies (Evans et al, 1996). Regional experiences differed greatly during 
and after this reform period. The major urban centres (Auckland in particular) grew 
quickly, while many peripheral areas either declined or grew only gradually. (Grimes 
et al, 2003, documents the effects of these developments on regional property prices.) 
This diversity of experience helps us analyse the determinants of insolvency, treating 
the regional data as a panel. 
Second, we seek to explain the total rate of forced insolvencies in 
New  Zealand. Total forced insolvencies include personal bankruptcies
1 as well as 
involuntary company liquidations. We group the two together since many personal 
bankruptcies are related to small business failures, where the business loan is secured 
over personal assets (Ministry of Economic Development [MED], 2001). 
                                                           
1 In what follows, we interpret personal bankruptcies as being “forced” although in some cases 
bankruptcy is “voluntary”. We do so since voluntary bankruptcies are most likely to be the result of an 
adverse financial situation which would otherwise lead to forced bankruptcy. 
1 New Zealand in particular has a large proportion of micro businesses—86% 
of all enterprises employ five or fewer full-time equivalent employees (MED, 
2003)—making personal bankruptcies especially relevant. 
Our work is informed by a number of other studies, especially Vlieghe 
(2001) and Platt and Platt (1994). Vlieghe’s theoretical approach, which we adapt, is 
laid out in Section 2. Platt and Platt employ a simple theoretical model, applying it as 
a panel to the states of the USA. They find that they can combine states into four 
groups; the failure rate of each group is driven by similar variables but with different 
elasticities. There are four variables that determine the (log of the) corporate failure 
rate in their model. They are the per cent change in state employment, the per cent 
change in profits earned by sole proprietorships, the (log of the) state real wage, and 
the per cent change (over two years) in the state business formation rate. The first two 
variables relate to business activity and revenues, the third is a component of business 
costs and the fourth reflects the fact that business start-ups have a higher failure rate 
than do established businesses. 
Platt and Platt (1994) emphasise the business formation rate.  This may be 
relevant to New  Zealand. As in the US, the failure rate of young firms in 
New Zealand is higher than that of older firms. Firms established in New Zealand in 
1995 had an average annual conditional failure rate of 25.8% over the first two years, 
dropping to 16.0% in the third year and to 12.3% over the next four years (MED, 
2003).
2  
We build on these studies by estimating long-run and dynamic models 
using panel data methods that explain total insolvencies at the regional level. We 
compare these estimates to an aggregate national model. This comparison indicates 
that the national model fails to detect crucial relationships captured by the regional 
data. This finding is in keeping with those of Platt and Platt. 
                                                           
2 These figures refer to the failure rate for firms which were established with five or fewer employees 
in 1995; these firms comprised 93.6% of all firms established that year. 
2 In Section 2, we outline our model and the data we used for estimation. 
Section 3 estimates the long-run and dynamic models at the aggregate and regional 
levels. We find that increases in regional economic activity and regional property 
values (which we used to represent the effects of collateral) reduce regional 
insolvencies. An increase in credit provision (increased leverage) raises the rate of 
insolvencies. In a low-inflation environment a rise in the inflation rate reduces 
insolvencies, but this effect disappears in a high-inflation environment. 
We discuss the implications of our results in Section 4. We focus especially 
on implications for the nature of regional adjustment to national and regional shocks. 
We also look at the implications for the finance-constraint literature, which posits that 
financial variables, possibly unrelated to firm performance, may contribute to firm 
failure (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1993). We estimate regional vector error correction 
models (VECMs) incorporating these features. Insolvencies interact with regional 
activity and property price shocks to provide rich regional dynamic adjustment 
processes in response to local shocks. 
2  Model and data 
A firm becomes insolvent when it cannot meet its financial obligations. 
Following Vlieghe (2001) and Wadhwani (1986) we model the probability of a firm 
becoming insolvent as the probability that the firm’s beginning—of—period assets 
and/or collateral plus current period profits are insufficient to meet its end of period 
financial obligations. 
For many small firms, the owner’s personal assets (often in the form of 
residential property) will form the bulk of the firm’s collateral asset backing since the 
owner will be required to post a personal guarantee over any loan that finances the 
business. PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2003) shows that 65% of the value of bank loans 
to small and medium-sized businesses (SMEs) were collateralised through personal 
property (house), compared with just 10% financed through fixed assets. For total 
business, the proportion collateralised through personal property (house) was 30% 
(again the largest category) compared with 21% financed through fixed assets. 
3 Firm k is illiquid, in the absence of refinancing, if: 
 iDk > Ak + Pk (1) 
 
where: 
•  i is the nominal interest rate 
•  Dk is the k’th firm’s (beginning-of-period) stock of nominal debt 
•  Ak is the k’th firm’s (beginning-of-period) stock of realisable 
assets/collateral 
•  Pk is the k’th firm’s (pre-interest) profits through the period, including any 
revaluations on beginning-of-period assets 
Time subscripts are suppressed for convenience. 
If the firm is illiquid, creditors may choose either to place the firm into 
liquidation or to extend further credit. For expository purposes, we assume that 
creditors place the firm into liquidation, but the model applies equally if some positive 
proportion of illiquid firms are placed into liquidation. 
We model Pk as the difference between the k’th firm’s revenue and its 
costs, comprising wages and material inputs, in which case condition (1) becomes: 
 iDk > Ak + Rk – (Wk + Mk) (2) 
 
where: 
•  Rk is the k’th firm’s revenue 
•  Wk is wages 
•  Mk is material inputs 
Using lower case letters to denote real (deflated) variables (while 
maintaining i as the nominal interest rate) gives: 
 idk > ak + rk – wk – mk (3) 
 
4 We model rk as a linear function
3 of real economic activity
4 (y), the 
exchange rate, the inflation rate and a random variable. Thus: 
 r k = α1y + α2e + α3π + εk (4) 
 
where: 
•  y is real economic activity 
•  e is the exchange rate 
•  π is the inflation rate 
•  εk is a random variable (with properties discussed in the text below) 
The activity term reflects a “Phillips Curve” type of relationship. Thus a 
positive effect of y on rk, and hence a positive effect on profits and a negative effect 
on firm insolvency, is expected. 
The exchange rate reflects the likelihood that an exchange rate appreciation 
adversely impacts on exporters’ revenue. It will also have an impact in reducing 
imported material costs, so the direct effect on profits is ambiguous. For firms 
competing in monopolistically competitive export markets, thus facing a downward 
sloping demand curve, an exchange rate appreciation will also tend to reduce output. 
Overall, therefore, a rise (appreciation) in the domestic currency is expected to impact 
negatively on both revenue and profits. 
To determine the effect we expect inflation to have on revenue it is 
necessary to consider a number of factors. The inflation term reflects the fact that 
inflation results in changes to the value of inventories and other beginning-of-period 
assets. Positive inflation has a positive nominal balance sheet effect which is reflected 
in asset revaluations, therefore raising profits. 
                                                           
3 The linear function is for expositional purposes only. We revert to a more general specification 
subsequently and subject empirical estimates to a Ramsey RESET test for functional form. 
4 Revenue may be best modelled as a function of gross sales rather than value added (GDP). In 
practice, we use a measure of economic activity which is compiled from a number of expenditure series 
(including retail sales) plus measures of activity in the labour market and elsewhere, and is therefore a 
combination of an expenditure and a production measure. We enter a deterministic time trend 
separately from economic activity and from other variables to reflect the combined trend effects of all 
included variables. Hence each variable, including economic activity, can be considered to be de-
trended using a deterministic time trend. We do not model trend activity using some other filter (e.g. 
via a Hodrick-Prescott filter) owing to the relatively short timespan of data that we have. 
5 Debt is normally denominated in nominal terms and so is not similarly 
revalued, although debt servicing rises if the expected inflation rate is reflected in the 
interest rate. This latter effect is accounted for independently through the interest rate 
term in (3) and so does not need to be considered separately. The inventory/asset 
revaluation effect indicates that inflation should have a positive impact on rk where rk 
includes revaluation effects. An additional effect of inflation on profits may arise if 
there is an asymmetric timing of cost versus output price increases in the presence of 
high inflation.
5 The effect of such timing impacts on profits is ambiguous in sign. 
Overall, therefore, the effect of inflation on rk is ambiguous, but is expected to be 
positive if the revaluation effect dominates. 
The random variable (εk) reflects other factors affecting rk, such as 
individual firms’ business practices (Fabling and Grimes, 2003). We assume that εk ~ 
(µ1, σ1) for recently established “start-up” firms and εk ~ (µ2, σ2) for firms that have 
been established longer. We hypothesise that σ1  >  σ2, reflecting the potential for 
greater uncertainty in the revenue stream of start-ups. We also hypothesise that µ1 < 
µ2, reflecting lower initial expected profits for start-up firms relative to established 
firms. 
Combining (4) and (3), firm k is modelled as being insolvent if: 
  εk < ak + α1y + α2e + α3π – wk – mk – idk (5) 
 
Thus the probability of failure of firm k (PFk) is a function, p1(.), of the 
variables that appear on the right hand side of (5): 
 PFk = p1(ak, y, e, π, wk, mk, i, dk) (6) 
 
Aggregating across all firms, and noting that the proportion of start-up 
firms in the economy, s, will have an impact on the aggregate rate where σ1 > σ2 
and/or where µ1 < µ2,  the total insolvency rate of firms across the economy (TIR) is 
given by the function (p2): 
                                                           
5 Our estimation period (1988–2003) covers primarily a low-inflation era. However, we also estimate a 
longer term bankruptcy equation over the 1978–2003 period, and over two sub-periods (1978–1987 
[high inflation] and 1988–2003 [low inflation]), to test whether the inflation effect differs across 
inflation regimes. 
6   TIR = p2(ak, y, e, π, wk, mk, i, dk, s, X) (7) 
    –   –  +  ?   +   +   +  +  + 
 
Expected signs indicated by the model above are shown below the variables 
in (7). X is a vector of non-stochastic variables relating to legislative changes over 
time pertaining to insolvency;
6 X also includes a time trend to account for trends in 
the underlying data (e.g. demand relative to potential output) and seasonality. Thus: 
  X =  [DUM, TIME, S1, S2, S3, S4]  (8) 
 
where: 
•  DUM is a dummy variable = 0 to 1994(2) and 1 thereafter to account for 
legislative change; 
•  TIME is a linear time trend to account for deterministic trends in the 
underlying variables;
7 
•  S1–S4 are seasonal dummies taking the value of 1 in the relevant quarter 
and 0 otherwise.
8 
We proxy the variables in (7) as follows. 
TIR is the total rate of forced insolvencies, that is, the sum of bankruptcies 
plus involuntary liquidations handled by both the Ministry of Economic Development 
and non-government agencies (source: Insolvency and Trustee Service, MED), 
expressed as a ratio of the total number of companies registered by the Companies 
Office.
9 The data does not include voluntary liquidations. Thus we are not explaining 
the total rate of company failure, restricting our attention to forced failure. 
                                                           
6 There was a change to New Zealand’s insolvency legislation via the Companies Act 1993. There was 
no intent in this Act to materially alter insolvency numbers, but we subject this to statistical test. 
7 We also tested a second time trend, TIME2 = 0 to 1994(2) and = a linear time trend thereafter 
(starting at 1 in 1994(3)), to test whether the deterministic trend breaks at the time of legislative 
change, but this variable was never significant, indicating that the coefficient on TIME is stable across 
sub-samples. 
8 Because we include four seasonal dummies, we have no separate constant term. 
9 In place of total number of companies, we would prefer to use the total number of units registered for 
GST since this measure would also include unincorporated businesses, but this data was not available. 
7 It is possible that some variables which appear in (7) may contribute to the 
overall failure rate but not to the forced failure rate. We have calculated the annual 
number of voluntary company deregistrations for 1989–2003 (June years) and related 
these to the annual number of personal bankruptcies and forced company liquidations. 
The correlation coefficient between annual percentage changes in bankruptcies and 
forced liquidations is 0.47, supporting our decision to group these two series together 
as total forced insolvencies. Voluntary deregistrations are negatively correlated with 
total forced insolvencies (the correlation is –0.28). It is possible that voluntary 
deregistrations occur faster after business difficulty than do forced liquidations, and 
the correlation between total forced insolvencies and lagged voluntary deregistrations 
is positive (0.26). In either case, the loose link between voluntary deregistration and 
forced insolvency needs to be borne in mind in interpreting our results.
10
Total insolvency data is available nationally and on a regional basis for six 
regions (based on the location of the nearest administrative office): Auckland, 
Hamilton, Napier, Wellington, Christchurch, and Dunedin. All regional data is 
subscripted j where j = 1,…,6 corresponding to the (north-south) order of these 
regions as listed above. 
TIR, as described above, is our theoretically preferred specification for the 
insolvency variable since it measures the involuntary death rate of firms. However, 
the company information is only available nationally and so cannot be used at a 
regional level. As an alternative specification, LTI is the (natural) logarithm of the 
number of insolvencies. This specification is used at the regional level. We test it also 
at the national level, finding similar results to the use of TIR, providing assurance that 
its use at the regional level does not materially affect the results. 
The regional insolvency data (LTIj) is graphed in Figure 1 (indexed, in each 
case, to 100 in 1988(1)). Appendix A lists the data for personal bankruptcies and 
company liquidations (our estimation uses the sum of the two) for each of the six 
regions and in aggregate across New Zealand. 
                                                           
10 This is especially important in relation to the impact of business start-ups on the subsequent 
insolvency rate. 
8 The mean number of insolvencies across the sample varies from lows of 62 
and 64 in Dunedin and Napier, to 313 in Auckland. Regional variation across time is 
similar, with the coefficient of variation in each region lying between 20% and 33%. 
From Figure 1, some differences and similarities in trends are apparent 
across the six regions. Over the first half of the sample, Auckland insolvencies 
increase considerably more than for the other five regions but subsequently, Napier 
and Christchurch “catch up”.
11 Hamilton varies around a consistent level, while 
Wellington and Dunedin insolvencies both tend to fall away, especially towards the 
end of the sample. The correlation coefficients between each pair of regions for the 
quarterly percentage change in total insolvencies are all positive, with the majority 
lying between 0.2 and 0.5. This level of correlation indicates some similarity in 
regional insolvency patterns across time, but also a material degree of difference in 
regional experience. 
The start-up rate (SR) is measured at national level by the number of newly 
registered firms with the Companies Office as a proportion of the total number of 
firms (source: MED).
12 We have no regional breakdown of this information. 
Given that personal bankruptcies dominate insolvency statistics, a relevant 
measure of ak is the previous period’s value of residential housing available as 
collateral. From the PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2003) study, personal housing is also 
relevant as a collateral measure for small and medium-sized enterprises. We use a 
measure, derived from Quotable Value New Zealand data, for the median value of the 
residential house price in each regional council nearest to the insolvency office 
(source: Motu
13). The real regional property price, LPRj, is given by the logarithm of 
the regional house price deflated by the national Consumers Price Index (CPI)
14 
(source: Statistics New Zealand [SNZ]). The average value of house prices across 
regions each quarter is used to proxy the national property price. 
                                                           
11 This "catching up" refers only to the insolvency level relative to insolvencies at the start of the 
sample; we do not have the data to ascertain whether regional insolvency rates converge or not. 
12 This measure includes genuine new entrants and existing unincorporated businesses that choose to 
incorporate. These two groups of firms may display different properties with respect to εk and this 
should be considered when interpreting the estimated effect of SR on TIR. 
13 Grimes et al (2003). 
14 Regional dispersion in consumer prices is minimal. 
9 The proxy for y is the logarithm of the National Bank of New Zealand 
(NBNZ) Regional Economic Activity index for each regional council, LEAj (i.e. 
Auckland, Waikato, Hawkes Bay, Wellington, Canterbury, Otago).
15 To maintain 
consistency, the NBNZ national series for Economic Activity is used at the aggregate 
level (source: NBNZ).
16
π is measured by the national rate of CPI inflation, excluding the effects of 
interest and GST (measured in per cent p.a.) for the latest four quarters (source: SNZ 
and Reserve Bank of New Zealand [RBNZ]), denoted INFL. 
The logarithm of the real wage rate (LWR), our proxy for wk, is measured 
as average hourly earnings (source: RBNZ) deflated by the CPI (excluding interest 
and GST). 
LPPI, our proxy for mk, is the logarithm of the ratio of Producer Price Index 
(Inputs) to Producer Price Index (Outputs) (source: SNZ). This variable captures input 
costs relative to producers' output prices and so more closely mirrors the conceptual 
nature of the variable than would deflating by the CPI.
17
Three alternative exchange rate measures were tested (all expressed as 
logarithms): the New Zealand/Australia exchange rate LNZDAUD (source: RBNZ), 
the NZD/USD rate, and the trade weighted index (TWI). Inflation in the relevant 
countries has been similar over the sample, so the nominal exchange rate is the 
primary determinant of volatility in the real exchange rate. Neither the NZD/USD nor 
the TWI had any explanatory power, while the NZD/AUD had some influence and so 
is preferred below. The NZD/AUD may be most relevant since Australia is 
New Zealand’s dominant market for exchange-rate sensitive elaborately transformed 
manufactures and other non-commodity exports. 
                                                           
15 We tested whether groups of regions have greater explanatory power than a single region (e.g. using 
Gisborne and Hawkes Bay to explain Napier insolvencies) but in each case the single region performed 
better, or as well as, grouped regions. 
16 The NBNZ National Economic Activity Index is closely correlated with official SNZ GDP. 
17 We also tested the logarithm of the inverse of the terms of trade, which is conceptually linked with 
LPPI and empirically correlated with it, but this variable was not significant. Our proxies for both wk 
and mk are relative price variables with no quantity component, reflecting an assumption that firms can 
make decisions on input quantities, but are price takers. Given the logarithmic form of our equations, 
scale effects are picked up through the activity variable. 
10 The debt measure, denoted LPSC, is the logarithm of real private sector 
credit (private sector credit/consumers price index) lagged one period to reflect the 
beginning-of-period debt stock (consistent with LPRj). The national measure is used 
since no regional measure of leverage is available. I90 is the 90-day bank bill rate 
(sources: RBNZ, SNZ, NBNZ).
 18
All data is available from 1988(2)–2003(1), so this period constitutes our 
estimation period for all long-run equations. Equations are extended to 2003(2) where 
data availability allows. 
We have tested the aggregate data for the presence of unit roots using 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests (reported in Appendix B). The tests indicate 
that a unit root cannot be rejected at the 10% level for each of I90, LEA, LWR, LPSC, 
TIR, LTI and LPR (with or without deterministic trend as appropriate), so these 
variables are regarded as non-stationary, I(1). LPPI and LNZDAUD are indeterminate 
(i.e. a unit root cannot be rejected at the 1% level but can be rejected at the 10% 
level). The tests indicate that INFL is stationary, I(0), at the 1% level (although it is 
indeterminate if a deterministic time trend is included). Over a longer time period 
(1978–2003) an ADF test on INFL indicates that we only reject a unit root at the 8.8% 
level. 
Given the indication that a unit root is present in the dependent variable (i.e. 
insolvencies expressed both as TIR and LTI) and that all independent variables either 
possess a unit root or are indeterminate in this respect, we estimate each of our 
relationships using a two-step Engle-Granger procedure.
19 The long-run equation for 
TIR (and LTI) is estimated as a function of the levels of the variables listed in (7) and 
(8). Changes in TIR (LTI) are then modelled as a function of the lagged long-run 
residual and current and lagged changes in the explanatory variables. This process is 
followed both for the aggregate data and for the regional data treated as a panel. 
                                                           
18 Most debt in New Zealand over the estimation period is floating rate, implying that a short-term 
interest rate should be used in the estimation. 
19 With respect to the variables which have indeterminate tests for stationarity, we note that if an I(0) 
variable is included in a co-integrating equation it does not give rise to inconsistent estimates (Banerjee 
et al, 1993), reinforcing our decision to include these variables given our theoretical model. 
11 For the regional data, we treat the parameters on the economic variables as 
identical across regions on the basis that similar economic forces are at work. We 
assess the cross-equation restrictions in the long-run equations by testing whether co-
integration holds for each region; if so, we take the specification as a valid set of long-
run equations. Restrictions within short-run equations are tested formally and we also 
check whether the equations meet the statistical diagnostic checks. The panel 
estimates with cross-equation restrictions considerably enlarge the degrees of freedom 
available to us, especially since regions have experienced quite different economic 
conditions at times through the sample period. This enables us to discriminate more 
sharply between different potential determinants of insolvencies. 
3 Results 
3.1 Aggregate 
Initially, we estimate (7) at the aggregate (New Zealand) level, using the 
insolvency rate (TIR) as the dependent variable. We then re-estimate the equation 
using the log of insolvencies (LTI) to check the robustness of our results for the 
alternative specification of the dependent variable. 
The long-run estimates for TIR are presented as (9a), those for LTI are 
presented as (9b).
20 In each case we have excluded variables with p-values on t-
statistics that are greater than 0.025 (noting that p-values, shown below coefficients, 
overstate the significance of a variable when dealing with non-stationary variables). 
We also exclude one variable (SR, start-up rate) which, relative to our theoretical 
model, has the wrong sign (discussed further below). 
 
 TIRt = –0.0179·LEAt – 0.0007·INFLt + 0.0145·LPPIt + 0.0052·LPSCt-1  (9a) 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.021)       (0.000) 
 
Sample: 1988(2)–2003(2) [n = 61]  ADF = –5.618 
 
 LTIt = –3.628·LEAt – 0.109·INFLt + 3.196·LPPIt + 1.728·LPSCt-1 (9b) 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.010)       (0.000) 
 
Sample: 1988(2)–2003(2) [n = 61]  ADF = –5.791 
                                                           
20 Seasonals are included in the specification, and are jointly significant, but are not reported for clarity. 
12 ADF test statistics for (9a) and (9b) indicate that each equation has a 
stationary residual (a unit root can be rejected at the 1% significance level using the 
critical values of Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993). Consequently, we take (9a) and 
(9b) as valid long-run aggregate specifications for the two dependent variables. 
We initially estimated the dynamic equations with current and lagged 
changes in all hypothesised variables entered; in the final equations we retain only 
variables which are significant at the 5% level. The resulting equations are presented 
as (10a) and (10b), where RES is the residual from the corresponding long-run 
equation. 
 ∆ TIRt = –0.428·RESt-1  – 0.0223·∆LEAt-1  (10a) 
(0.001)    (0.002) 
 
Sample: 1988(3)–2003(2) [n = 60]  R
2 = 0.66 
 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test for serial correlation: p = 0.38
21
 
 ∆ LTIt = –0.527·RESt-1 – 3.734·∆LEAt-1 (10b) 
(0.000)    (0.013) 
 
Sample: 1988(3)–2003(2) [n = 60]  R
2 = 0.69 
 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test for serial correlation: p = 0.17 
In interpreting this set of equations we note, first, the close similarity of 
results between the TIR and LTI specifications, both with respect to the variables that 
are included and their individual significance levels. (Scale effects mean that absolute 
coefficient estimates are not comparable.) The explanatory power of each equation is 
similar.
22
                                                           
21 The equation also passes tests for normality, ARCH processes, functional form, and parameter 
stability (with a mid-sample break-point) with a minimum p-value of 0.30. 
22 We do not report the R
2 for the long-run equations because they relate to I(1) variables, but as usual 
with the first stage of a two-step regression, they are 0.99 and 1.00 respectively. 
13 Second, three variables—economic activity (LEA), inflation (INFL) and 
private sector credit (LPSC)—are highly significant in the long-run equations; a 
fourth—relative producer prices (LPPI)—is included, although its true significance 
(given it is an I(1) variable) is not so clear. When the exchange rate (LNZDAUD) is 
added to (9a) it has the correct sign (positive) and a t-statistic of 1.91; it is also 
positive when added to (9b) but has a t-statistic of just 1.00. Given its lack of 
significance we do not include it in the final equations. Property, wage, interest rate 
and time trend variables do not appear significantly in either specification. 
Third, the (lagged) start-up rate (SR) appears significantly when added to 
each specification, but with a negative sign. If taken at face value, this would imply 
that an increase in start-ups decreases the firm failure rate, which is at odds with the 
micro evidence on firm failure. The reason for this finding is likely to be that the firm 
start-up rate rises in anticipation of good economic conditions. If those conditions 
eventuate as expected, the subsequent aggregate insolvency rate will diminish, thus 
establishing a negative correlation between TIR and lagged SR.
23  We attempted to 
solve this problem by modelling SR separately as a function of forward-looking 
variables, and then including the residual from this equation in the TIR equation as a 
measure of “over-expansion” of new firms in circumstances where economic 
conditions did not evolve as expected. This procedure removes the significance of the 
negative coefficient of SR in the TIR equation, but did not establish a significant 
positive relationship. Coefficients on other variables are little changed by the 
inclusion or exclusion of SR. 
It is also possible that failure of newly established firms occurs more 
frequently through voluntary liquidation rather than through forced liquidation or 
bankruptcy, especially if people starting them can at first only access external finance 
that is well collateralised. Our earlier analysis of the link between voluntary company 
deregistrations and forced insolvencies is consistent with this explanation. 
                                                           
23 In addition, the mix of newly incorporated firms (between genuine start-ups and previously 
unincorporated businesses) may change as economic conditions change, confounding the estimated 
impact of SR on TIR. 
14 A further possibility is that our data, which includes personal bankruptcies 
as well as forced company liquidations, masks the impact of company start-ups on 
company insolvencies, but when we restrict our attention solely to forced company 
insolvencies the negative relationship between SR and insolvencies remains. As 
Figure 2 shows, there is also strong collinearity between the rate of start-ups and the 
ratio of private sector credit to economic activity during our sample, and this may 
have clouded the estimate for the effect of the start-up rate on TIR. 
Fourth, the dynamic specifications indicate the importance of recent 
changes in economic activity, as well as the long-run economic climate, on 
insolvencies. Other long-run influences impact quickly on the insolvency rate, with 
approximately half of the adjustment to the long run occurring within a quarter. The 
short-run equations explain approximately two-thirds of the quarterly variation in 
forced insolvencies. 
The aggregate forced insolvency equations ((9) and (10)) cover the period 
1988–2003. We have data for aggregate personal bankruptcy, but not for company 
liquidations, from March 1976 (also listed in Appendix A; the earlier bankruptcy data 
comes from SNZ). We have re-estimated the equations in (9b) and (10b) in identical 
fashion using this data from 1977 onwards (given availability of other data) to test the 
robustness of our estimates over a longer time period. The extended time period 
contained major economic shocks, including the second oil shock and the initial post-
1984 economic reform measures. The equations estimated over the full period are 
listed as (11) and (12a) below (where LTB is the logarithm of total bankruptcies and 
LGDP is the logarithm of real GDP
24). 
 LTBt = –4.155·LGDPt – 0.025·INFLt + 3.062·LPPIt + 2.525·LPSCt-1  (11) 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.004)    (0.000) 
 
Sample: 1977(4)–2003(2) [n = 103]  ADF = –3.59 
 
                                                           
24 We use SNZ’s Real GDP data in place of National Bank Economic Activity and have backdated the 
PSC data using the Reserve Bank’s historical series to 1986 with the intervening 1986–1988 data 
linked using the intervening quarters’ data for M1. Other data is as described earlier. 
15  ∆ LTBt = –0.240·RESt-1  – 3.140·∆LGDPt-1  (12a) 
(0.001)     (0.003) 
 
Sample: 1978(1)–2003(2) [n = 102] R
2 = 0.40 
 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test for serial correlation: p = 0.001 
The estimates in (11) and (12a) are similar to those of (9b) and (10b), 
despite a different dependent variable, a different measure for economic activity and a 
longer time period. All variables that are significant over the shorter period are also 
highly significant over the longer period. The effects of economic activity, materials 
prices relative to output prices, and credit provision all remain similar in size to those 
of the previous estimates. 
The only coefficient that changes materially in size is that on inflation. The 
1977–1987 period was characterised by high inflation in New  Zealand (averaging 
13.4% p.a. over this period, compared with an average 3.0% p.a. in 1988–2003). The 
estimates in (11) imply either that the effect of high inflation on insolvencies differs 
from the effect of low inflation, or else that personal bankruptcies are much less 
affected by inflation than are company liquidations. 
To distinguish between these explanations, we re-estimated (11) over split 
samples: 1977–1987 and 1988–2003, the latter being our sample for LTI. In the latter 
sub-sample, the coefficient on INFL was –0.021 (p = 0.012) which is considerably 
smaller than the –0.109 estimated for the LTI equation. This comparison indicates that 
inflation has had a greater positive impact on company survival than on personal 
bankruptcies over the recent period. In the earlier period, the coefficient on inflation 
drops further, to –0.013 (p = 0.057), which is not even statistically significant 
(especially in a long-run equation). This result suggests that the effect of inflation on 
insolvency disappears entirely in a high-inflation environment. The disappearance of 
this effect over the early sub-sample is consistent with sustained inflation affecting 
inflation expectations, and thence being reflected in nominal interest rates, more so in 
a high-inflation regime than in a low-inflation regime. Thus inflation has offsetting 
effects on the insolvency rate in a high-inflation environment which are absent, or less 
pronounced, in a low-inflation environment. 
16 The residuals of (12a) exhibit significant first order autocorrelation. We 
have re-estimated the dynamic equation using current and lagged changes of all 
variables, plus the lagged residual; equation (12b) reports the resulting equation after 
dropping terms not significant at the 5% level. The LM test rejects the presence of 
serial correlation in the residuals. Again, changes in economic activity are shown to 
affect the dynamics of aggregate insolvencies (bankruptcies). 
 ∆ LTBt = –0.158·RESt-1 – 0.386·∆LTBt-1 – 2.346·∆LGDPt – 3.543·∆LGDPt-1
(0.021)     (0.000)     (0.032)     (0.000)     (12b) 
 
Sample: 1978(1)–2003(2) [n = 102]  R
2 = 0.50 
 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test for serial correlation: p = 0.24 
3.2 Regional  panel 
We now use the additional information available from the regional data to 
estimate (7) and its dynamic counterpart at the regional level, treating the regional 
data as a panel. We have six regions over 60 quarters,
25 giving 360 observations. 
Because the error terms may be correlated across regions, we use seemingly unrelated 
regressions to estimate the panel. The log of regional insolvencies (LTIj) is the 
dependent variable. 
In estimating the panel, we test whether we can restrict the coefficients on 
all variables, other than those in X, to be identical across regions. We do so initially 
by examining whether each individual long-run equation is co-integrated after 
imposition of the cross-equation restrictions. Rejection of a unit root (acceptance of a 
co-integrating vector) implies it is valid to consider that firms in each region are 
impacted similarly by the economic variables under consideration. Rejection of the 
cross-equation restrictions implies either that region-specific reactions to the included 
variables differ materially or else that the equations suffer from omitted (non-
stationary) variables. Seasonality and trends in the underlying data may differ across 
regions and the effect of legislative change may also have differed across regions,
26 so 
we do not impose cross-equation restrictions on the X vector. 
                                                           
25 We drop the second quarter of 2003 as LPR (real regional property price) is available just to 2002(4). 
26 In the event, our estimates indicate that legislative change had no effect on either the level or trend of 
insolvencies in any of the regions. 
17 The results of estimating the long-run panel equation are given in Table 1. 
LEA (regional economic activity) and LPR (property prices) are measured regionally, 
while other explanatory variables are national. The same criteria for choosing to retain 
or omit variables are used here as in the aggregate case. 
Table 1: Long-run regional determinants of LTIj





























































ADF  –5.505 –6.039 –10.679  –7.122 –5.438 –6.712 
Sample: 1988(2)–2003(1)  [n = 360] 
Coefficients on LEAj,t, INFLt, LPSCt-1, and LPRj,t are restricted to be identical across regions. 
The estimates in Table 1 are similar to those in equation (9b), with the 
inclusion of economic activity (here at a regional level), inflation and real private 
sector credit as before. One variable from (9b), relative producer prices (LPPI), is not 
significant at the regional level, and that was the least significant variable in the 
aggregate specification. The time trend is significant in four of the six regions and, for 
consistency, we include it for all six regions. 
One new stochastic variable appears: lagged property prices (LPR). 
Inclusion of this variable is in keeping with the importance of collateral—measured at 
the regional level—for avoiding forced insolvency. 
The ADF tests indicate that we can reject a unit root in the residuals at the 
1% level for each equation. This indicates that the cross-equation restrictions (on 
LEA, INFL, LPSC and LPR) are consistent with a valid long-run specification for 
each region. An F-test of the combined long-run and dynamic cross-equation 
restrictions follows after the dynamic estimates are reported in Table 2. 
18 When the equations in Table 1 are estimated without imposing cross-
equation restrictions, we find generally consistent parameter estimates. All six 
regional estimates for the inflation (INFL) parameter lie between –0.07 and –0.12; 
five of the estimates on private sector credit (LPSC) lie between 1.2 and 3.1; and four 
of the estimates on activity (LEA) lie between –4.1 and –5.8. The coefficient 
estimates on property prices (LPR) are less consistent, with the restricted estimate 
being driven primarily by Napier (–1.3), Dunedin (–1.0) and Hamilton (–0.5); the 
other three LPR estimates are not significantly different from zero. We have also 
examined long-run parameter stability across regions by estimating the system 
dropping each region in turn (i.e. estimating six systems, each comprising five 
regions). The resulting estimates on LEA range from –4.252 to          –5.006; on INFL 
from –0.088 to –0.102; on LPSC from 1.409 to 1.817; and on LPR from –0.116 to –
0.460. All coefficient estimates have p < 0.025 except for three of the LPR estimates 
(one of which has p = 0.065). 
Dynamic equations, based on the restricted long-run estimates, are 
presented in Table 2. 
Table 2: Short-run regional determinants of LTIj






































2 0.60 0.58 0.57 0.55 0.33 0.47 
Rho[p]  0.615 0.615 0.615 0.615 0.615 0.615 
Sample: 1988(3)–2003(1)  [n = 354] 
Coefficients on RESj,t-1, ∆LEAj,t, and ∆INFLt, and Rho[p] are restricted to be identical across regions. 
Rho[p] is the p-value of the coefficient on the lagged short-run residual 
where the short-run residual is regressed on the lag of itself plus the variables 
appearing in Table 2 (with cross-equation restrictions). This test is similar to the 
single equation Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation test. The test indicates no 
significant autocorrelation (even in the presence of cross-equation restrictions). 
19 Explanatory power of the equations is similar to that for the aggregate 
equation for four of the regions, despite the greater noise-to-signal ratio that is 
normally found in regional compared with national data. 
As with the aggregate short-run equation, contemporaneous economic 
conditions impact significantly on the dynamics of regional failure rates. A rise in the 
rate of regional economic growth and in the inflation rate both reduce the change in 
forced insolvencies. Adjustment to the long run is much faster with the regional 
estimates than is indicated by the aggregate equation, being almost complete within 
one quarter. This finding is consistent with an aggregation bias effect reported by 
Imbs et al (2002) with respect to product aggregation and real exchange rate 
adjustment to fundamentals; where regional shocks are not perfectly correlated with 
one another, the aggregate adjustment equation may be mis-specified. 
The estimates in Table 2 incorporate sets of restrictions to each of the long-
run and short-run parameters of the system. We formally test the complete set of 
restrictions and the short-run restrictions by estimating: (a) the combined system in a 
completely unrestricted fashion, and (b) an unrestricted dynamic system incorporating 
the long-run restrictions. In estimating (a), the variables in the long-run specification 
are each included with a one-period lag in place of RESj,t-1, noting that a linear 
combination of these variables is stationary. An F-test on the 35 parameter restrictions 
included across the entire system (i.e. system (a) compared with the system 
incorporating both long and short-run restrictions) yields an F-statistic of 1.56, which 
is identical to the 5% critical F-value. Testing just the long-run restrictions, by 
comparing system (b) with system (a), yields an F-statistic of 0.87, compared with a 
5% critical value of 1.84. A test of just the short-run restrictions, through a 
comparison of system (b) with the system incorporating both long and short-run 
restrictions, yields an F-statistic of 2.57, compared with a 5% critical value of 2.07 
and a 1% critical value of 2.87. Together, these tests indicate that we cannot reject the 
long-run cross-equation restrictions (consistent with the prior co-integration findings), 
although the short-run cross-equation restrictions are borderline significant. 
20 4  Discussion and interpretation 
Area-specific shocks impact on incomes and asset values within regions. 
Our analysis indicates that shocks to regional activity and property values, as well as 
national developments in inflation and credit provision, affect the prevalence of 
regional company failures. Specifically, changes in regional economic activity impact 
on revenues and thence on the probability of individual company failure, while 
changes in property prices impact on collateral values. Regional economic activity has 
a direct effect on property prices (Grimes et al, 2003) but so do other variables (such 
as interest rates and new housing supply). Thus house prices incorporate the effects of 
shocks over and above the effect of economic activity, and act on insolvency rates 
through a different channel than does economic activity. Faced with a rise in the price 
of a property used for collateral, a creditor is less pressured to force a debtor into 
insolvency since the risk to loan repayment is reduced. 
Conversely, a negative shock to regional property prices results in increased 
regional insolvencies. Given that undischarged bankrupts are not allowed by 
New Zealand law to enter into business alone, be a company director or take part in 
management of a company (normally for a period of three years after initial 
bankruptcy), the effect of a regional property price downturn, with its associated 
increase in insolvencies, may be to inhibit regional entrepreneurship, at least for a 
period. Thus an initial regional downturn can have a magnified—and/or prolonged—
effect on regional economic outcomes, particularly if company closures are not 
matched during the same period of time by the start-up of new businesses and/or 
expansion of existing firms.
27
                                                           
27 Existing firms and potential start-ups in a region are likely to be impacted by the same events that led 
to the rise in insolvencies, so it is doubtful if new start-ups or surviving firms’ expansion will offset the 
forced insolvency effect. 
21 An illustration of the interactions between regional economic activity, 
regional house prices and regional insolvencies is given in Figures 3 and 4. We 
estimate unrestricted vector error correction models (VECMs) involving these three 
variables for each of the two smallest regions in our sample: Napier and Dunedin.
28 In 
each case, the VECM incorporates each of the variables included in the equations 
reported in Table 2 (LTI, LEA, LPR, INFL, LPSC, TIME, S1, S2, S3, S4). We treat 
the first three of these variables (insolvencies, economic activity and property prices) 
as endogenous within the VECM (each being regional variables); inflation and private 
sector credit are treated as exogenous (being aggregate variables); and the non-
stochastic variables are also treated as exogenous. The specification includes four lags 
of the differenced variables plus a single co-integrating vector (CV). The Johansen co-
integration test indicates a single CV for Dunedin and two CVs for Napier.
29 
Therefore, for robustness, we also present results using two CVs in the VECM 
(Figures 5 and 6). 
The impulse response functions for each endogenous variable in response to 
one standard deviation innovations in the endogenous variables are shown for a 
twenty-quarter horizon.
30 We focus on the response of economic activity (LEA) and 
property prices (LPR) to a rise (positive innovation) in insolvencies (LTI) and the 
response of LTI to rises in LEA and LPR. 
                                                           
28 Napier and Dunedin are chosen since these are region-specific VECMs. Developments in each of 
these regions are likely to have fewer flow-on effects to other regions or to aggregate variables (such as 
inflation and aggregate credit supply) and thence back to themselves than is the case for the larger 
regions. The region-specific specification is therefore more appropriate for these regions than for a 
larger region such as Auckland. 
29 For Napier, the results are consistent (two co-integrating vectors) for both the trace statistic and the 
maximum eigenvalue statistic, at both the 5% and 1% levels. For Dunedin, the results are consistent 
(one co-integrating vector) for each of these tests except for the trace statistic at the 5% level, which 
indicates three co-integrating vectors. 
30 The ordering of the Choleski decomposition in each case is LPR, LEA, LTI. The ordering does not 
materially alter the patterns of response. 
22 A positive innovation to LEA (shown as lea_n and lea_d for Napier and 
Dunedin respectively) has a permanent (five-year) negative effect on LTI in Napier 
(with both one and two CVs); the effect in Dunedin is approximately zero (slightly 
negative with two CVs and slightly positive with one CV). A positive innovation to 
LPR has at least a transitory negative effect on LTI in each case, with a permanent 
effect in each of the single CV cases. The effects of a rise in LTI are more clear-cut. A 
positive innovation to LTI has permanent negative effects on LEA and LPR in each 
case. These effects are in keeping with the earlier estimates in this paper. 
A permanent innovation to LTI may result from a change in legislation 
pertaining to insolvency. For instance, a change to the legal framework that facilitates 
increased business rehabilitation following a firm's difficulties (in cases where long-
term survival of the firm is feasible) could induce a negative innovation to LTI.
31 In 
addition, a change to bankruptcy legislation that reduces the impact of becoming 
bankrupt on an entrepreneur’s re-entry into entrepreneurial activities may lessen the 
effect of a given level of insolvencies on subsequent economic activity. In neither 
case, however, could we infer that the parameters estimated here would necessarily 
apply, since the nature of the innovation is different to that experienced historically; 
nevertheless, conceptually the direction of effect should be the same. 
The VECM results and the collateral effects indicated by the earlier 
regional and aggregate equations help to increase our understanding of the role of 
financial factors in company insolvency. The estimates indicate that increased 
aggregate credit provision is a positive contributor to the rate of insolvencies. The 
New Zealand economy, in keeping with trends in other developed countries, has seen 
a considerable increase in leverage through the period under consideration.
32 This 
increase in debt has been coupled with a rise in the rate of business start-ups, in part 
financed by the greater availability of credit. The partial effect of these developments, 
exhibited through the importance of LPSC in explaining the insolvency rate, is to 
increase the rate of forced insolvencies. 
                                                           
31 A new business rehabilitation framework has recently been proposed in New  Zealand (Dalziel, 
2003). 
32 The ratio of real private sector credit to economic activity increased by 45% between 1993 and 2000 
(see Figure 2). 
23 To the extent that increases in real property prices cause real collateral 
values to keep up with the greater real value of credit, this leverage effect can be 
mitigated. Reflecting these offsetting effects, there has been no trend increase in 
aggregate insolvencies in New Zealand since the start of the 1990s despite the strong 
increase in credit provision. 
A temporary increase in inflation is another avenue by which the impact of 
increased leverage on the insolvency rate can be mitigated. As inflation rises, asset 
values (including collateral and inventory values) rise and firms are better placed, in 
the short term, to service and/or repay their outstanding debt, thus reducing the 
insolvency rate. However, a longer-term increase in inflation will be reflected in 
increases in inflation expectations, nominal interest rates and debt servicing, offsetting 
the beneficial asset value effect. Our estimates over the high-inflation period indicate 
that a rise in inflation loses its beneficial impact on insolvencies under persistent 
inflationary conditions. The lack of inflation effect on the insolvency rate under these 
conditions, but significant effect with low inflation, is consistent with the thesis that 
higher inflation may have a short-term positive impact on company balance sheets but 
only when inflation is unanticipated or otherwise not incorporated into financial 
prices. 
Overall, our work reiterates the findings of Platt and Platt, Vlieghe and 
others that economic activity is an important determinant of insolvencies. Financial 
market developments have played a major role through the greater provision of credit, 
contributing to greater leverage and thus greater risk of firms being unable to service 
and/or repay their debt. Regional developments interact with each of these effects, 
making regional activity and regional asset values key transmitters of area-specific 
shocks to regional insolvencies. The feedback of insolvencies on regional economic 
variables can then magnify and prolong regional economic cycles. 
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31 Appendix A: Bankruptcy and involuntary 
company liquidations 
TOTAL* AUCK HAM NAP WELL CHCH DUN TOTAL AUCK HAM NAP WELL CHCH DUN
Mar-88 404 70 97 25 48 61 52 126 60 22 7 22 13 2
Jun-88 416 100 99 30 42 68 49 222 110 42 11 23 32 4
Sep-88 577 113 159 32 54 83 77 212 111 33 11 25 23 9
Dec-88 475 99 123 34 46 64 51 189 107 21 11 24 18 8
Mar-89 453 82 125 38 60 61 47 192 104 32 9 20 24 3
Jun-89 491 127 105 40 36 71 64 265 141 44 9 28 30 13
Sep-89 487 113 102 29 34 73 88 291 174 38 8 37 24 10
Dec-89 510 132 112 29 43 74 67 244 125 22 14 36 34 13
Mar-90 426 117 90 33 50 53 35 212 103 31 15 33 26 4
Jun-90 477 154 82 20 64 63 48 286 163 22 17 45 28 11
Sep-90 513 156 95 25 63 80 47 266 141 48 9 32 27 9
Dec-90 467 136 82 56 65 82 46 269 148 26 15 44 25 11
Mar-91 447 152 91 32 49 83 40 212 113 23 15 32 23 6
Jun-91 625 246 119 51 58 102 49 284 179 30 5 38 28 4
Sep-91 839 318 190 74 84 107 66 293 163 32 20 45 26 7
Dec-91 651 226 131 65 90 97 42 263 167 23 8 46 15 4
Mar-92 641 225 110 40 98 98 70 223 115 29 10 41 16 12
Jun-92 706 293 124 51 75 106 57 273 121 32 18 74 25 3
Sep-92 675 279 127 40 90 84 55 274 136 40 21 47 26 4
Dec-92 602 261 112 36 77 74 42 274 137 33 10 52 28 14
Mar-93 611 242 109 53 76 94 37 183 89 30 20 28 15 1
Jun-93 644 256 126 36 78 93 55 260 137 24 9 64 18 8
Sep-93 700 275 127 53 85 99 61 271 156 20 14 45 25 11
Dec-93 525 230 75 22 74 81 43 261 139 34 9 48 25 6
Mar-94 585 235 82 42 86 101 39 184 103 23 13 19 20 6
Jun-94 502 222 103 18 52 75 32 172 95 46 4 15 8 4
Sep-94 530 193 112 48 68 66 43 222 93 41 21 33 22 12
Dec-94 420 160 76 53 47 67 17 166 85 14 10 25 27 5
Mar-95 460 160 77 38 60 85 40 147 74 16 2 29 25 1
Jun-95 553 228 92 39 61 98 35 204 108 26 16 35 13 6
Sep-95 507 164 99 30 72 112 30 192 78 25 8 45 30 6
Dec-95 503 165 58 52 57 108 63 193 92 18 11 27 34 11
Mar-96 525 163 96 46 83 84 53 191 94 40 7 24 16 10
Jun-96 623 180 141 66 75 97 64 184 87 30 14 24 14 15
Sep-96 660 247 95 49 90 135 44 170 85 19 12 27 20 7
Dec-96 585 188 89 66 66 117 59 133 55 20 14 11 28 5
Mar-97 555 192 91 49 62 116 45 154 76 21 4 20 25 8
Jun-97 666 170 106 72 96 158 64 270 106 33 19 53 46 13
Sep-97 754 194 118 77 99 167 99 306 162 42 18 29 48 7
Dec-97 683 224 126 60 79 127 67 272 122 36 22 28 53 11
Mar-98 700 211 137 73 72 142 65 265 108 46 13 22 69 7
Jun-98 837 279 152 74 63 190 79 235 116 25 8 28 49 9
Sep-98 918 313 170 65 79 194 97 266 137 26 6 32 61 4
Dec-98 769 245 143 73 65 163 80 223 100 39 14 24 40 6
Mar-99 847 281 159 89 68 164 86 264 138 21 4 30 64 7
Jun-99 763 296 122 78 50 169 48 234 128 19 14 18 49 6
Sep-99 742 249 128 72 70 153 70 232 122 41 5 26 34 4
Dec-99 651 189 110 61 46 167 78 212 119 22 11 23 29 8
Mar-00 615 188 110 61 51 146 59 133 58 19 7 19 19 11
Jun-00 692 213 121 81 61 154 62 233 138 17 9 20 45 4
Sep-00 736 233 151 80 39 152 81 273 148 28 5 22 59 11
Dec-00 703 222 152 63 46 152 68 192 119 12 3 15 40 3
Mar-01 740 253 156 44 70 143 74 103 48 8 6 8 30 3
Jun-01 707 232 131 89 44 148 63 127 8 0 71 01 21 8
Sep-01 870 279 146 88 63 224 70 189 108 20 10 23 27 1
Dec-01 668 196 161 66 52 147 46 102 44 12 5 2 39 0
Mar-02 637 173 104 64 74 159 63 89 55 4 4 11 15 0
Jun-02 643 199 130 41 55 166 52 108 66 8 8 10 15 1
Sep-02 734 219 160 83 56 176 40 82 50 11 5 6 10 0
Dec-02 658 224 129 63 59 146 37 124 85 11 5 4 17 2
Mar-03 628 170 123 82 46 157 50 62 5 34500
Jun-03 625 223 84 68 68 154 28 196 130 50 2 3 11 0




*Between March 1988 and September 1990 “Total” includes bankruptcies not attributed to any 
region. 
  Total forced insolvencies is the sum of personal bankruptcies and involuntary company 
liquidations.  
 
32 Total personal bankruptcies prior to March 1988 are listed below. The total series 
are directly comparable. 
 
 
Mar-76 79 Mar-79 96 Mar-82 130 Mar-85 204
Jun-76 68 Jun-79 131 Jun-82 106 Jun-85 224
Sep-76 86 Sep-79 133 Sep-82 164 Sep-85 192
Dec-76 76 Dec-79 140 Dec-82 169 Dec-85 249
Mar-77 94 Mar-80 125 Mar-83 188 Mar-86 207
Jun-77 92 Jun-80 162 Jun-83 222 Jun-86 219
Sep-77 112 Sep-80 157 Sep-83 225 Sep-86 284
Dec-77 117 Dec-80 164 Dec-83 229 Dec-86 255
Mar-78 117 Mar-81 127 Mar-84 167 Mar-87 300
Jun-78 127 Jun-81 137 Jun-84 184 Jun-87 260
Sep-78 140 Sep-81 143 Sep-84 244 Sep-87 345
Dec-78 125 Dec-81 150 Dec-84 219 Dec-87 324
TOTAL Personal bankruptcies
 
Source: Statistics NZ, series BALQ.SA. 
33 Appendix B: ADF unit root tests—Aggregate 
variables 












INFL  0.046 0.22  0.002  I(0) 
I90  0.271 1.56  0.144  I(1) 
LEA  0.286 2.72  0.991  I(1) 
LWR  0.794 1.54  0.882  I(1) 
LPPI  0.220  0.95  0.047  I(0) or I(1) 
LNZDAUD  0.096  0.79  0.024  I(0) or I(1) 
LPSC  0.407 2.51  0.993  I(1) 
TIR  0.150 2.13  0.130  I(1) 
LTI  0.087 1.39  0.128  I(1) 
LPR  0.314 2.46  0.874  I(1) 
1ADF p-value. 
2Value of t-statistic on Trend variable. 
3Lag length for ADF test chosen using Schwartz Information Criterion. 
34 Acronyms 
Acronym Page  first 
mentioned 
Definition 
MED  9  Ministry of Economic Development 
VECMs  10  Vector error correction models 
SME  10  Small and medium-sized businesses 
GDP  11  Gross Domestic Product (Real) 
CPI  14  Consumers Price Index 
NBNZ  14  National Bank of New Zealand 
SNZ  14  Statistics New Zealand 
RBNZ  15  Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
ADF 15  Augmented  Dickey-Fuller 
TWI  15  Trade weighted index 
M1  18  Money supply (narrow definition) 
CV 23  Co-integrating  vector 
Variables    
TIR  12  Total insolvency rate 
TIME 12  Time  trend 
LTI  13  (natural) logarithm of the number of insolvencies 
SR  14  Start-up rate  
LPR  14  Real regional property price (logarithm of the 
regional house price deflated by the national CPI) 
LEA  14  Logarithm of the NBNZ Regional Economic 
Activity index for each regional council 
INFL  15  Inflation in the consumers price index (CPI), 
excluding effects of interest and GST for the latest 
four quarters, (% p.a.) 
LWR  15  Logarithm of the real wage rate (wage rate/CPI) 
LPPI  15  Logarithm of the ratio of Producer Price Index 
(inputs) to Producer Price Index (outputs) 
LPSC  15  Logarithm of real private sector credit (PSC/CPI)  
I90  15  90-day bank bill rate 
LTB  18  Logarithm of total bankruptcies 
LGDP  18  Logarithm of real GDP 
RES  19  Residual from corresponding long-run equation 
S1, S2, S3, 
S4 
23  Seasonal dummies taking a value of 1 in the 
relevant quarter and 0 elsewhere 
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  Motu Economic and Public Policy is a non-profit Research Institute (Charitable Trust) 
that has been registered since 1 September 2000. The Trust aims to promote well-informed and 
reasoned debate on public policy issues relevant to New Zealand decision making. Motu is 
independent and does not advocate an expressed ideology or political position.  
  Motu aims to enhance the economic research and policy environment in New Zealand by 
carrying out high quality independent research, teaching through universities and other institutions, 
training junior research staff, facilitating networks of researchers, hosting foreign researchers and 
organising small conferences and dialogue groups. It is our belief that objective research and 
analysis is a critical foundation for making informed policy decisions and we are committed to 
wide dissemination of our work.  
  Motu's primary strength lies in its people. All of our principal researchers have PhDs in 
economics from top international universities as well as extensive public policy-related work 
experience. Our distinctive contribution is an emphasis on sound empirical analysis, supported by 
our expertise in and knowledge of economic theory and institutional design. We choose research 
areas that build on the interests and expertise of our principal researchers. Our current priorities are 
in the areas of environmental regulation, labour and social policy, and macroeconomics. 
  We maintain strong links with a large pool of internationally renowned experts in our 
chosen fields. These international linkages are critical to our success, and one of our major 
contributions to New Zealand.  
  Our research funding is primarily in the form of research grants. We see this as a means 
of maintaining our commitment to the quality and objectivity of our research. We are able to 
compete internationally for such funding because of the calibre of our principal researchers and 
because of international fascination with the New Zealand reforms. Some of our funding comes 
from foreign foundations and governments. This serves not only to expand the available pool of 
research on New Zealand policy issues, but also to stimulate wider interest in these issues. We also 
seek unrestricted funding from individuals, foundations and corporations to allow us to build a 
stronger research infrastructure within Motu and the wider research community. This allows us to 
actively disseminate ideas, create longer term independent research programs that do not meet 
short-term funding priorities, and organise networks and conferences involving other researchers 
and policy analysts. 
Motu purposes 
1.  Carrying out and facilitating empirical and theoretical research on public policy issues 
relevant to New Zealand; the quality of the research will meet international academic 
standards, suitable for acceptance in reputable academic journals. 
2.  Making existing knowledge more accessible for policy debates in New Zealand; this 
may be done by summarising and critically reviewing existing work on public policy 
issues, or by contributing to and facilitating policy discussions through seminars, 
workshops, and dialogue groups. 
3.  Disseminating the results of our work and knowledge through publication (particularly 
in refereed publications), the internet, conferences, seminars, workshops, dialogue 
groups, and teaching. 
4.  Building New Zealand capacity to carry out empirical and theoretical research on New 
Zealand public policy.  This will be done through means such as training, 
collaboration, sponsorship of students or researchers and development of New 
Zealand databases.        
5.  Maintaining close links with international experts working on topics related to our 
purpose through communication and collaboration. 
6.  Advancing our work and purpose within New Zealand by facilitating the visits of 
relevant international visitors. 
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